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Abstract
We investigate the link between securitization and asset prices and show that increases 
in the growth rate of the volume of ABS issuance lead to a sizable decline in bond and 
equity premia. Furthermore, we show that in a model where banks select their portfolio of 
assets and create synthetic securities, the compensation for undertaking risk decreases as 
securitization increases. The pooling and tranching of credit assets relaxes both the funding 
and the risk constraints banks face allowing them to increase balance sheet holdings. 
Accordingly, the drop in risk premium may be unrelated to a decline in actual risk.
Keywords: pooling and tranching, equity, government bonds, bank portfolio, risk premia.
JEL classifi cation: E44, G12, G2.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza la relación entre el volumen de titulización de activos de crédito y los precios 
de bonos y acciones. Se muestra que aumentos en la tasa de crecimiento de titulización 
generan una disminución considerable en primas en el mercado de bonos y de renta variable. 
En un modelo teórico se demuestra que cuando los bancos seleccionan su cartera de 
activos y crean activos sintéticos, la compensación por la exposición al riesgo en la economía 
disminuye en la medida que aumenta la titulización. La agregación y la división en tramos de 
activos crediticios relajan tanto los costes de fi nanciación como la exposición al riesgo de los 
bancos, lo que permite aumentar la cartera de activos a bancos que mantienen una cartera 
diversifi cada. Por tanto, es posible que la disminución de la prima de riesgo no identifi que la 
verdadera disminución en la exposición al riesgo de los activos en el mercado de bonos y de 
renta variable.
Palabras clave: agregación y división en tramos, acciones en el mercado de renta variable, 
bonos del Gobierno, cartera de los bancos, prima de riesgo.
Códigos JEL: E44, G12, G2.
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1. Introduction
The volume of securitized assets traded in the US has grown remarkably from the
beginning of the 1990s until the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis, when it collapsed.
Figure 1 shows the monthly volume of issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and their sum (all) from January 1993 until December 2010.
Such volumes have been determinant in shaping the development of ﬁnancial markets and
particularly ﬁnancial intermediation, motivating several studies to analyse their eﬀects on
credit issuance and standards, focusing particularly on mortgage markets. The general
message is that mortgage securitization increases loan supply and lowers aggregate price
of credit. Although securitization has traditionally been higher in the mortgage market,
our data shows that the issuance of ABS matches the issuance of MBS in the beginning
of the 2000’s. Furthermore, the participants in the market for asset-backed securities are
ﬁnancial entities, comprising ﬁnancial companies and funding corporations, sometimes
referred to as shadow banks, who hold a more diverse portfolio than commercial banks.
As a result, due to potential portfolio eﬀects, those high volumes of securitization might
aﬀect other asset classes. The focus of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the eﬀects of
securitization on bond and equity markets.
Figure 1: Volume of Securitization - US
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We ﬁrst conduct an empirical analysis that looks at the dynamic properties of bond and
equity excess returns (risk premia1) and identify the eﬀects of variations in the volume of
securitization on asset prices. The benchmark empirical speciﬁcation builds upon the work
of Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003), and sets up a general vector autoregressive (VAR)
process for asset returns including the volume of securitization, the bond premium and the
equity premium. Additionally, as they do, we include the short-term rate, the dividend-
1We will use excess returns and risk premia interchangeably. Note that in some studies risk premia is
deﬁned as the expected excess return.
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price ratio and the yield spread. We ﬁnd that an innovation to the growth of asset-backed
securitization leads to a statistically and economically signiﬁcant drop in term spreads,
equity and bond premium and contribute to explain their variance. A monthly increase of 5
billion USD in the volume of ABS issued in the market leads to a 5 basis point movement in
bond premium and a 272 basis point decrease in equity premium. Although the benchmark
empirical analysis focuses on the period before the crisis, we ﬁnd that the relationship
between securitization and asset prices seem to hold also for the post-crisis period (after
2008). We then augment the model in order to detect whether this link is related to
ﬁnancial intermediation or whether securitization might be instrumenting for other aspects
of the economy or the ﬁnancial markets. For this purpose we include a wide range of control
variables in our estimations next to securitization measures. For instance, we control for
risk perceptions/aversion (vix), for the Cochrane-Piazessi factor (CP) in order to account
for the consumer’s heteroscedastic discount factor as suggested by Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005), for expectations about economic performance, for changes in credit conditions
(credit spread) and equity payoﬀ (expected earnings-per-share). Additionally we control
for international U.S. asset demand and corporate bond issuance. Our results remain by
and large unaltered and thus indicate that speciﬁc aspects of ﬁnancial intermediation that
are related to ﬂuctuations in securitization aﬀect prices and volumes of diﬀerent asset
classes other than credit in a signiﬁcant way.
While comparing the eﬀects of diﬀerent segments of the securitization market we ﬁnd
that the link between securitization and asset prices is stronger with asset-backed securities
than with mortgage-backed securities. We believe that this is because shadow banks and
securities and broker-dealers became important players in the ABS market reinforcing the
view that the eﬀect occurs through the portfolio allocation changes due to securitization.
Data from the Federal Reserve Bank Flow of Funds on total asset holdings and their growth
during the 90’s and 2000’s, depicted in Figure 2, conﬁrms the importance of these ﬁnancial
entities2 relative to commercial banks and other sectors in the economy (households and
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms). Note that the accumulation of assets of these entities is very much
linked to the volume of securitized assets issued in the US market. The growth of assets
is faster during the 90’s as volume of securitization quickly reached around 50 billion
USD per month. After that, the growth rate of assets decreases during the early 2000’s
while monthly volumes of issuance in the securitization markets remained fairly constant.
Asset holdings start to increase sharply again during the next period of growth in the
securitization market, from 2002/2003 till 2006/2007, when monthly issuance reached 200
billion USD. In fact, when we include both securitization and security and broker dealers
asset holdings in our (quarterly) VAR speciﬁcation we conﬁrm this link, an innovation to
the asset backed securitization leads to a sharp increase in asset holdings. Finally, using
2Shadow banks comprise of ﬁnancial companies, funding corporations and ABS issuers. We then add
securities and broker-dealers and compare their total to that of commercial banks.
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our quarterly speciﬁcation we observe that our results are unaltered when we incorporate
banking capital in our estimations.
Figure 2: Increasing Relevance of Financial Sector
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(b) Growth of Assets in Diﬀerent Sectors
We then propose a theoretical model that can account for our empirical ﬁndings and
use it to discuss the channels through which ﬁnancial intermediation and particularly, se-
curitization practices, aﬀect asset prices and risk premia. The model’s two key ingredients
are: banks3 can create a market for securitized assets by designing and selling synthetic
securities (securitization decision), and select which assets to hold in their balance sheet
(portfolio decision). In creating the securitization market we follow DeMarzo and Duﬃe
(1999) closely and motivate the issuance of synthetic securities as a tool to create liqui-
dity. Banks select the allocation of assets to maximize expected returns subject to two
constraints: they must fund all purchases with internal and with, potentially costly, ex-
ternal funds and they must abide by a risk constraint. We ﬁnd that securitization, or the
pooling and tranching of credit assets, allows banks to expand their balance sheets since
it not only relaxes the banks’ cash or funding constraint but also their risk constraint. As
a result, securitization allows banks to take additional exposures not only on credit but
also on bonds and equity. The desire to increase exposure in all asset classes stems from
the fact that concentrating asset holdings in one class depresses returns and, due to lack
of diversiﬁcation, increases the shadow cost of risk. Greater asset demand increases prices
and depresses risk premia, conﬁrming the empirical results.
One of the implications of the theoretical model is that although the intrinsic cha-
racteristics of assets, their return and risk proﬁle, have not changed, and the degree of
risk aversion has remained the same, higher volumes of securitization decrease the com-
pensation for risk bearing in the economy. In other words, there is a potential mismatch
between actual and market price of risk due to securitization process. As pointed out by
Rajan (2005), reduced premia/volatility does not directly imply reduction in risk.
3Unless otherwise speciﬁed banks are generic ﬁnancial entities holding a diversiﬁed portfolio of assets
and engage in ﬁnancial intermediation.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1526
The framework also corroborates the importance of ﬁnancial intermediation in deter-
mining asset prices. As ﬁnancial intermediation is linked with asset prices through the
functioning of the securitization market we can use the structural characteristic of this
market to understand the channels through which this link occurs. The volume of securi-
tization in our model is primarily linked to the degree of asymmetric information. Focusing
on informational issues also allow us to stress the optimality of pooling and tranching, key
components behind the portfolio mechanism we propose. However, the framework also
highlights other drivers of the volume of securitization, for instance, the degree of riski-
ness of credit baskets and the compensation to undertake tranche related risk. While the
volume of deals might be inﬂuenced by a variety of factors,as long as pooling and tran-
ching is done, allowing banks to relax cash and risk constraints, the portfolio mechanism
highlighted here establishes a link between the variation in the volume of securitization
(and those factors) and bond and equity premia.
Related Literature
Our work is connected to three main streams of literature. Firstly, it is linked to the
empirical literature that studies the eﬀect of securitization on credit market outcomes.
Loutskina and Strahan (2009) show that credit supply is sensitive to lender’s funding res-
trictions for illiquid loans, classiﬁed as such since they cannot be securitized, but is not
for their liquid counterpart. Hence, their results indicate that high levels of securitization
in the US would lead to higher loan supply. Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez
(2009) look at the banking sector in Europe and conclude that securitization has streng-
thened banks’ capacity to supply new loans. Finally, Jime´nez, Mian, Peydro´, and Saurina
(2010), by using data from Spain, conclude that wholesale ﬁnance allows banks with access
to securitization to increase their credit supply and decreases the aggregate price of credit.
In all cases, including ours, the common feature is that securitization leads to a balance
sheet expansion of banks. However, these studies look at credit markets only, while we
attempt to look at the impact of securitization on other asset classes.
The second and main literature that our paper relates to is the one that focuses on the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation on asset prices. He and Krishnamurthy (2013) show that,
during periods of crisis, binding banking capital constraints help to explain the evolution of
risk premia. Our results indicate that diﬀerent characteristics of ﬁnancial intermediaries’
balance sheets can be relevant in asset pricing even when banking capital is not a direct
concern. Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) stress
that the growth of assets in the balance sheet of security and broker-dealers inﬂuences
asset prices and risk premia. These studies are the closest to ours since as the data shows
securitization and balance sheet expansion of these entities are closely linked. Our added
contribution is that, by looking closely at the portfolio choice of ﬁnancial intermediaries
and incorporating one of the key aspects in their decision, namely, the ability to create and
sell synthetic assets, we are able to identify the potential channels and structural parame-
ters that link ﬁnancial intermediation and asset prices. Finally, Aksoy and Basso (2014)
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also explore the eﬀects of bank’s portfolio choice but focus on maturity transformation
and the gap between long and short-term interest rates in a general equilibrium setting,
linking ﬁnancial intermediation with ﬂuctuations in term premia.
Lastly, our paper relates to the literature that analyse leverage cycles. Danielsson,
Shin, and Zigrand (2012) provide a framework linking ﬁnancial intermediation, leverage,
volatility and risk premium, stressing the role of bank’s balance sheet in asset price deter-
mination. However, their mechanism relies on ﬂuctuations in bank capital. Leverage in
our framework ﬂuctuates as an outcome of the securitization markets while bank equity
is held constant. In fact we show that our empirical results remain the same when we
control for movements in banking capital. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) also look at
ﬁnancial innovations and leverage, and as here stress the importance of tranching to gene-
rate leverage. However, they focus on the ﬁnal investors’ demand based on heterogenous
beliefs leading to asset price bubbles while we focus on the the importance of pooling and
tranching in shaping the portfolio decisions of banks, establishing a link between ﬁnancial
intermediation and asset prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical analysis. The
theoretical model and its solution are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the main
implications of our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis focuses on establishing whether variations in the volume of se-
curitized credit assets aﬀect diﬀerent asset markets, particularly by looking at the dynamic
patterns of risk premia in ﬁxed income and equity markets. Our starting point is a ge-
neral vector autoregression (VAR) for asset returns used by Campbell and Viceira (1999)
and Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003). Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) employ
a VAR containing the returns of the main ﬁxed income and equity assets, namely the
short-term rate, the excess return on government bond (bond premium) and the equity
excess return (equity premium). Additionally, they include the dividend-price ratio and
the yield/term spread (diﬀerence between short and long term rates). Given our focus
on securitization we add the variation in the volume of securitized assets traded as an
additional variable. Our main interest, therefore, is in assessing whether there is additio-
nal information content in ﬂuctuations in securitization for explaining variations in excess
market and bond returns and establishing the eﬀect of a shock to this additional variable
on the dynamic responses of asset returns. In order to identify these shock responses we
follow the identiﬁcation structure of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999). As such,
the VAR moving average representation is given by
zt = B(L)ut, (1)
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where B(L) is the matrix of moving average coeﬃcients and z
′
t =
[
x′1t, i′t ,x′2t
]
the vec-
tor of observables. it represents the securitization measure we use, with i = {dABSt,
dMBSt, dALLst} for asset backed securitization, mortgage backed securitization and ag-
gregate securitization, used one at a time. Note that x1t is a (k1×1) vector with elements
whose contemporaneous and lagged values inﬂuence the variables of interest at time t and
x2t is a (k2 × 1) vector with elements whose values are only aﬀected by an innovation to
the variables of interest at time t. Finally, ut is a (k×1) vector of reduced form errors with
k = k1 + 1 + k2. We want to obtain an impact matrix A¯ linking reduced form errors (ut)
to fundamental shocks (εt) such that ut = A¯εt. We assume that A¯ has a block triangular
structure with zero in its upper diagonal.
For our benchmark analysis, we assume x1t is empty, placing all remaining variables
in x2t, hence the securitization variable is ordered ﬁrst, being unaﬀected by the other
variables contemporaneously. This identiﬁcation assumption reﬂects the fact that the
securitization process normally requires the creation of a new accounting entity (special
purpose vehicles) that holds and commercializes the assets and the pooling and tranching
of assets that are then rated by external credit agencies. As a result, it involves a time
delay from decision to implementation greater than the reaction time of asset prices. Thus,
it appears natural to assume that asset prices can only aﬀect the volume of securitization
with a lag.4
Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) employs a ﬁrst-order VAR using a relatively long
dataset of quarterly or annual frequency. As shown in the introduction, the develop-
ment of the securitization market is a recent event (last 15-20 years). Moreover, given
our identiﬁcation and the fact that a bank’s portfolio selection should occur at much
shorter frequency, we use a monthly dataset. As a result, in order to capture suﬃcient
dynamics (particularly in ﬁxed income return) we estimate the model with four lags. We
calculate impulse responses to a securitization shock and associated one standard error
bias-corrected bootstrap conﬁdence bands as suggested by Kilian (1998). Before discussing
the estimation results we present the dataset.
2.1. Data
Our securitization data, obtained from Dealogic5, consists of daily data on asset (ABS)
and mortgage backed securitization (MBS) with tranche values and deal dates completed
4Note that we use the face value and not the proceeds of each deal to construct our variable and thus
ﬂuctuations at auction day do not aﬀect our measure of securitization.
5We obtain a deal report with deal type equal to ABS or MBS, currency code equal to USD, nationality
of risk equal to USA and deal price date from beginning of 1993 until October 2014.
in the US from the year 1993 onwards. Using this dataset, we are able to construct
monthly time series data of the volume of transacted securities in the US ﬁnancial markets.
Figure 1 (depicted in the introduction) displays the levels data for both ABS and MBS
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securitization volumes and an aggregate measure (all), with their summation. As is clear
from the ﬁgure, while securitization started from rather modest levels by early 1990s,
aggregate securitization steadily increased reaching their peak in March 2007.6 Figure 1
suggests that there is a structural break in the securitization process in 2007 where market
of synthetic securities froze and ﬁnancial institutions and/or ﬁnal investors started to move
away from the practice. This is long before the full blown realization of the ﬁnancial crisis
in September 2008 triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
In the VAR, we include seasonally adjusted asset and mortgage backed securitization
transformed in annualized monthly log diﬀerences in percentage terms, denoting them
respectively, dABS and dMBS.7 We also construct a monthly aggregate securitization
series (alls) being the simple sum of MBS and ABS (labelled as dALLs). Next to the
securitization data, our empirical exercise utilizes the following data series. Benchmark
monthly excess market returns (xr) annualized, obtained from the Kenneth French web-
site, are based on Fama-French method and summarize the excess return on the (equity)
market over the risk free rate (3 months T-Bill rate). We use monthly Fama-Bliss Discount
Bonds as reported by CRSP to calculate annual excess bond returns (xbr) over 2,3,4 and
5 years horizons as described in Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) for the calculation of
yields and in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) for the calculation of the excess bond returns,
i.e. xbr
(n)
t+1 = r
(n)
t+1 − y(1)t where xbr(n)t+1 denotes the n year excess log return, r(n)t+1 denotes
the log holding period return from buying an n-year bond at time t and selling it as n− 1
year bond at time t + 1 and y
(1)
t denotes the log yield. We use monthly real price divi-
dend ratio (rpd) that is calculated using the log diﬀerence in real dividends and real stock
prices (S&P Composite Stock Price Index) as reported and updated by Robert Shiller’s
stock market data. Term spreads (spread) are computed as the diﬀerence between the ﬁve
year government bond rate and 3 months T-Bill in percentages per annum. Real short
term rates (realr 3m) are calculated using the 3 months T-Bill rate and the CPI inﬂation.
Our full sample covers the period from January 1993 up until October 2014. However,
conditional mean and variances have most likely changed as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis
and central bank intervention, which inﬂuenced market liquidity and consequently the
securitization market, preventing us from estimating the full period without accounting
6We note that the asset backed securitization increased from a monthly average of 5.2 billion USD in
1993 to 86.4 billion USD in 2006 (a 1540% increase) and the mortgage backed securitization increased
from a monthly average of 3.5 billion USD in 1993 to 93.4 billion USD in 2006 (a 2603% increase). By the
second quarter of 2007 both securitization markets collapsed and volumes remained at much lower levels
as compared to pre-crisis period.
7We use Census X12 method to remove cyclical seasonal movements from securitization series and to
extract the underlying trend component. In our estimations we also use non-adjusted series to check for
the robustness of the results. Our results by and large do not change.
for the regime change. In order to do so we would need a longer post-crisis dataset than
we currently have. As a result, in our benchmark VAR estimations we only use data from
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1526
January 1993 till November 2007; thereby we exclude the period after the collapse of the
securitization market that later on became a full blown ﬁnancial crisis.8
2.2. Estimation Results - Parsimonious model
As mentioned before our starting point is a parsimonious representation of asset returns
provided by Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003). We therefore set up the benchmark VAR
with Z
′
t =
[
i′t ,x
′
2t
]
, where x2t = [rpdt, spreadt, xbrt, xrt, realr 3mt]. Thus, the variable
of interest, in a recursive fashion is log diﬀerence in securitization, i.e. dABS or dMBS
and the variables in x2t are respectively, log of dividend-price ratio (rpd), term spreads
(spread), excess bond returns over two years horizon (xbr), excess market returns (xr),
and short term real rates (realr 3m).
Figure 3: Impulse Responses - Parsimonious Model
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Figure 3 displays the impulse responses with respect to a shock to variations in diﬀerent
types of securitization. The top panels show responses to a shock in changes in ABS. We
see that term spreads decline signiﬁcantly. Excess bond (2Y) returns show a signiﬁcant
8Although inference is problematic due to shortage of post-crisis data, in one of our robustness exercises
we use data after 2008 checking whether the link between securitization and asset prices remain unchanged,
see discussion in the next section and Appendix for results.
decline that lasts nearly a year. Excess equity market returns do not respond signiﬁcantly
instantly but suﬀer a sizeable and signiﬁcant decline for the next quarter, rebounding
quickly after that. Although we only depict the one standard deviation conﬁdence bounds,
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the cumulative eﬀect of the ABS on bond premium after 5 periods and on the equity
premium after 2 periods (their respective peak eﬀects) are both signiﬁcant at 5% conﬁdence
level. The impulse responses show the eﬀect of changes in securitization volume when all
the interactions amongst the asset price variables are considered. We also run predictive
return regressions9 that include variations in asset backed securitisation among return
predictors similar to Adrian Moench and Shin (2010). Lags of asset backed securitization
negatively aﬀect term spreads, bond and equity premia. Results show that the direct
eﬀect of the changes in securitization (its second lag) on bond and equity premium are
signiﬁcant at 10% and 5% conﬁdence level, respectively (see Appendix for the regression
output results).
Our results indicate that the link between the variations in the volume of securitization
and asset prices is not only statistically signiﬁcant but also economically signiﬁcant. A
monthly increase of 5 billion USD in the volume of ABS issued in the market (the average
monthly volume of ABS issuance from 1993 till 2007 was 36 billion USD, although during
2003-2007 this average was around 75 billion USD) leads to a 5 basis point movement in
bond premium after 5 periods, which implies a 10% movement in bond premium relative
to its sample mean, and a 272 basis point decrease in equity premium after 2 periods,
which implies a 35% movement in excess return relative to its sample mean. In order
to further analyse the dynamic relationship between securitization and asset prices we
also inspect the forecast error variance decompositions (FEV). We observe that by the
twelfth month about 7.5% of variations in excess bond returns is attributable to shocks
to variations in ABS, about 20% of variations are attributable to term spread shocks and
nearly 70% of variations are attributable to its own (excess bond returns) shocks. FEV
analysis in the case of excess equity market returns also shows a similar contribution of
dABS. Over a twelve month horizon, approximately 46% of forecast error variance in
excess market returns are attributable to shocks to dividend-price ratio, whereas 6.2% of
forecast error variance of excess returns are attributable to shocks to variations in ABS.
As is well known, excess market returns exhibit much less persistence, thus only 39% of
its forecast error variance are attributable to its own shocks. Finally, VAR based excess
market returns predictive estimation that includes dABS increases its in-sample-ﬁt (as
measured by the adjusted R-squared) from 2 to 4 points as compared with the VAR
speciﬁcation without the inclusion of dABS.
9We estimateRxit+1 = αi+βi
′∗Zt+εit+1, whereRxit+1 consists of excess returns on term structure, bonds
and equities and deﬁned as Rxit+1 = [spreadt+1, xbrt+1, xrt+1] and Zt are the vector of return predictor
variables with four lags with dividend price ratio and 3-months real interest rate, lags on the excess returns
next to variations in asset backed securitization. We deﬁne Zt =
[
rpdt, realr 3mt, dABSt, Rx
i
t
]
.
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The bottom panels exhibit responses to a shock to variations in mortgage backed
securitization. We observe that, initially, spreads decline as in the ABS case but the mo-
vement is statistically insigniﬁcant. Excess bond returns response to the shock is initially
a decline, however it rebounds quickly and becomes insigniﬁcant. Finally excess equity
market returns response to mortgage backed securitization is similar to its response to the
asset backed securitization, i.e. no initial response followed by a stronger and signiﬁcant
decline in excess returns. Overall, we ﬁnd that the response to a MBS shock is much less
pronounced compared to the responses to variations in asset backed securitization. When
investigating the FEV, we note that the contributions of shocks to variations in MBS
to explain forecast error variance of excess bond returns is negligible and around 2% for
market returns.
We also run the VAR with the aggregate measure of securitization, dALL. Given that
the volume of securitization in the mortgage market (MBS) is normally greater than that
of ABS, the impulse responses (not reported here) are closer to the one observed for MBS
than for ABS. Overall securitization has a stronger and more signiﬁcant impact on equity
premium than on bond premium. The FEV for excess bond returns suggests that the role
of shocks to aggregate securitization in explaining the forecast error variations in excess
bond and market returns are negligible. In the case of excess market returns, the role of
total securitization is more pronounced in explaining the forecast error variance. By the
twelfth month about 10% of forecast error variance in excess market returns is attributable
to shocks to variations in aggregate securitization. Finally, VAR based excess market
returns predictive estimation that includes dALLs increases the in-sample-ﬁt (as measured
by the adjusted R-squared) from 2% to 7% as compared with the VAR speciﬁcation
without dALLs.10
We perform a series of robustness tests using the parsimonious model, focusing only
on the estimation using the variation in the volume of ABS. Details are presented in the
appendix. Firstly, we verify whether the impact of securitization on asset prices is driven
by the remarkable increase in the volume of deals during the 2003-2007 period, when
many new ﬁnancial instruments were introduced. We restrict the data set to the period
1993 - 2002 and ﬁnd that the negative impact of innovations to securitization volumes on
bond and equity premium remain unchanged. However, securitization shocks contribute
relatively less in explaining FEV in excess bond and market returns for this sample period
and the size movement in equity premium after an ABS shock is also smaller, reducing to
around 150 basis point for a 5 billion monthly increase in ABS, indicating that the link
between securitization and asset prices become more relevant during the 2003-2007 period.
We also formally assess the stability of the coeﬃcients in our linear speciﬁcations. We use
the Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR) statistic (in Wald form) and the Andrews-Ploberger
10All these results are robust to measures of excess bond returns up to ﬁve years horizon.
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exponential average Wald statistic to assess parameter stability. Our test results suggest
that there is no evidence of parameter instability for the period 1993-2007.11
Secondly, we use data from January 2009 until October 2013, eﬀectively estimating
the period after crisis as a new regime.12 Although inference is impaired by the lack of
degrees of freedom, we ﬁnd a similar pattern of response to both bond and equity premia,
with a downward movement of bond premium, reaching its lowest level 5 periods after the
securitization shock and equity premium moving down after a few periods and rebounding
quickly after that. Variance decomposition analysis also paints a similar picture, with
securitization shocks contributing to explaining around 6% of forecast error variance in
excess bond returns and around 4.5% of FEV in excess market returns. Thus, the results
indicate that the link between securitization and risk premia across other asset classes has
not been substantially altered by the recent crisis, although the monthly volume of deals
return to the level observed in the early 2000’s.
Thirdly, we focus on the identiﬁcation assumption by altering the ordering of the
variables in the VAR. We set x2t = ∅ and x1t = [rpdt, spreadt, xbrt, xrt, realr 3mt], thus
securitization can only aﬀect asset prices with a lag, but is aﬀected by the other variables
contemporaneously. The negative eﬀect of securitization on bond and equity premia are
qualitatively unchanged. We also note that shocks to equity and bond premia13 do not
lead to lower volume of securitization (in fact if anything securitization tends to initially
increase after these shocks), thus reverse causality does not seem to hold.
2.3. Estimation Results - Augmented model
The results of the parsimonious model of asset return dynamics indicate there is a role
for variations to the volume of asset backed securitization in explaining the ﬂuctuations in
excess bond and excess market returns. Mortgage backed securitization does not appear to
be linked to excess bond returns, although it has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the equity premium
(thus variation in the total volume of securitization explains a signiﬁcant part of variations
in excess market returns). In order to increase our understanding of the added value of
looking at the securitization markets to explain risk premia, and assess the robustness of
our results, we augment the benchmark model in several directions, particularly focusing
on the potential eﬀects of omitted variables.
We subdivide the vector x2t = [x2at,x2bt], such that x2bt = [rpdt, spreadt, xbrt,
11For details see Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and Hansen (2000). Andrews (1993)
recommends t1=.15 and t2=.85 trimming for the sup-Wald test and for the exponential test, Andrews and
Ploberger (1994) recommend t1=.02 and t2=.98 trimming. Results are available upon request. We are
grateful to Bruce Hansen for providing the matlab code for these tests.
12Note that we need one year ahead data to calculate bond premia.
13In order to analyse the eﬀect of, for instance, a shock of bond premium, we set x1t = xbrt and the
remaining variables as part of x2t, thus bond premium can aﬀect securitization contemporaneously, but
the VAR remain as close as possible to the benchmark case. We do the same for spread and excess market
returns.
xrt, realr 3mt] contains all the variables included into the benchmark model and x2at
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represents additional controls. That way, all controls, together with the securitization can
have a contemporaneous eﬀect on asset returns. We now explain each control and the
rationale for including them.
It is possible that including of measures of securitization may be serving as instruments
for changes in some aggregate risk perception criteria. In order to try and correct for
possible biases due to this omission, we incorporate a market volatility measure and set
x2at = vixt. The CBOE Volatility Index (vix) captures the investor sentiment and market
volatility embedded in the near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 market index option
prices as provided by Bloomberg.
Securitization may also be related to future economic performance, as perceived by
market participants. In order to account for that we include a measure of consumer
expectation about future economic conditions: E5Y index is derived from a ﬁve years
forward looking question on conﬁdence from the Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations
(see Barsky and Sims (2011) and Aksoy and Basso (2014) for diﬀerent applications of the
relation between E5Y and future economic activity).
Of course, securitization practices may not be directly linked to general economic
performance but could be linked to positive news on ﬁrm performance that increase credit
and equity payoﬀ outlook. Thus, we ﬁrstly incorporate the expected earnings-per-share
(deps), which is calculated by using the twelve months forward weighted average expected
earnings per share based on S&P 500 composite as reported by I/B/E/S. Secondly, we
include a control for aggregate credit spread level using the credit spread index proposed
by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), setting x2at = gzt. Thirdly, we control for the growth
rate of the volume of corporate bond issuance in the U.S. setting x2at = bondt.
14
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) have shown that the ﬁve year government bond forward
rate is a useful predictor of the excess returns on two year bonds when we abandon the
expectations hypothesis. Their explanation is based on the consumption Euler condition.
When bond prices are determined by the expected relative marginal utilities divided by
inﬂation, a conditionally heteroscedastic discount factor will generate time varying bond
risk premium. Therefore, if ﬁnancial intermediaries securitization decision is unrelated
to the consumption Euler condition, we should see additional information content in va-
riations in securitization next to Cochrane-Piazessi factor (CP); so we set alternatively
x2at = CPt.
Finally, securitization volumes may be relevant for asset prices since they may be as-
sociated with changes in the foreign demand for U.S. securities prior to the crisis (global
saving glut hypothesis). In order to account for independent variations in asset prices
coming from this channel, we include monthly estimates of foreign holdings of U.S. se-
14Data on bond issuance is also collected from Dealogic.
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curities as provided by Bertaut and Tryon (2007). 15 We control for all security types,
that is Treasury bonds (x2at = treast), agency bonds (x2at = agcyt), corporate bonds
(x2at = corpt), equities (x2at = stkt)) and an aggregate measure (x2at = tott).
Figure 4 displays the corresponding impulse responses that include one of the additional
controls (excluding foreign asset demand) at a time when dABS and when dMBS are used
as the securitization measure, respectively. Figure 17 in the appendix shows the eﬀects of
foreign demand for U.S. assets. Inspecting these ﬁgures suggests that impulse responses
remain broadly the same after including diﬀerent controls. Hence, we conclude that a
shock to changes in asset backed securitization leads to a decline in term premium, equity
and bond premium, while there is no signiﬁcant impact of a shock to mortgage backed
securitization on excess bond returns and a negative but a relatively smaller eﬀect on
excess returns on equity.
15Essentially, Bertaut and Tryon (2007) data consists of cross-border securities data collected by the
Treasury International Capital (TIC) system. Foreign holdings of U.S. securities are measured in the
comprehensive surveys of U.S. liabilities to foreigners. These data are available by country of holder,
by security type (Treasury bonds, agency bonds, corporate bonds, and equities), and by type of holder
(oﬃcial or private). They combine these periodic survey data with monthly transactions data on cross-
border purchases and sales of U.S. Treasury, agency, corporate bonds, U.S. equities, and foreign stocks and
bonds (the TIC S data). Further data details are available in Bertaut and Tryon (2007).
Inclusion of the ﬁnancial markets volatility as a proxy for risk perceptions (vix) changes
the proﬁle of FEV in the case of excess market (equity) returns. When the VAR includes
dABS by the twelfth month about 5.8% of variations in excess market returns are attribu-
table to shocks to variations in ABS, about 42% of variations are attributable to shocks
to vix, about 20% of forecast error variance in excess market returns are attributable to
shocks to dividend-price ratio, whereas 23% of forecast error variance of excess returns are
attributable to its own shocks. In other words, vix is relevant in explaining variations in
Figure 4: Augmented Models - Results
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the excess market returns, but crucially, the contribution of the volume of securitization
remains largely unchanged. A similar picture arises in the case of the inclusion of vix in
the VAR with dMBS. In the case of VAR estimation with dALLs, by the twelfth month,
about 9% of FEV in excess market returns are attributable to shocks to dALLs, 43% to
shocks to vix, 19% to shocks to price-dividend ratio and about 22% to shocks to excess
market returns.
Second, while the CP factor appears to be important for explaining the FEV in bond
excess returns, controlling for it does not aﬀect the shape of the impulse responses nor the
FEV contribution of ABS shocks. By the twelfth month, the shocks to dABS account for
about 6% of FEV decompositions in bond excess returns while the CP factor account for
nearly 71% of variations.
Finally, controlling for total international demand for US ﬁnancial assets appears to
be important in explaining the FEV in equity returns, however, in line with the results
with other controls, it does not aﬀect aﬀect the shape of impulse responses and the FEV
contribution of ABS shocks.
The empirical results, therefore, indicate that securitization impacts negatively, both,
the bond and the equity premium. Moreover, this explanatory power is not related to
the potential link between the changes in the volume of transactions in the securitization
market with the degree of risk perception/aversion of agents, intertemporal consumption
Euler conditions, or with the general economic or credit and equity returns outlook. As
a result, the channel through which this eﬀect occurs may be more directly related to the
functioning of ﬁnancial intermediation when the originate to distribute mode of operation
is more heavily employed.
Given that our results are stronger when the volume of asset-backed securities is used
instead of the one of mortgage backed securities, one must look at shadow banks and
securities and brokers dealers, which are more active in that niche of the market relative
to traditional commercial banks. Furthermore, shadow banks and broker dealers normally
hold a more diverse portfolio of assets that are not only concentrated on credit products
but also contain equity and ﬁxed income products, making the potential portfolio eﬀects
of the high activity in securitization markets more likely to be observed.
Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) look at the
link between the growth rate of asset holdings of securities and broker dealers and various
asset price measures, stressing the importance of ﬁnancial intermediation and leverage
in determining asset prices. Moreover, Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2012) shows that
leverage may be linked to re-valuation of bank capital. The balance sheet data of ﬁnancial
entities at the FED however is only available at a quarterly frequency. We thus run three
sets of estimation of a quarterly frequency VAR (with 1 lag). The ﬁrst includes the same
variables as in the benchmark case. The second includes the growth rate of securities and
brokers dealers asset holdings as an additional control variable and ﬁnally we control for
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variations in bank capital (as measured by the diﬀerence between the assets and liabilities
of ﬁnancial business using Flow of Funds data).
Results are presented in the Appendix. From the ﬁrst estimation we observe that a
securitization shock leads to lower equity premia and term spreads, although the eﬀect on
bond premium is positive but insigniﬁcant. When securities and brokers dealers’ assets
are included, the eﬀect of securitization on risk premia are quantitatively the same and, as
expected, we also observe that asset holdings respond positively to a securitization shock.
Finally, when bank capital is included, the eﬀects on term and equity premia remain the
same while bond excess return are negative but still statistically insigniﬁcant. Note that
an increase in secutitization volume does not systematically aﬀect bank capital, but it
aﬀects total assets, therefore it only aﬀects leverage.
We believe both our and Adrian, Etula, and Muir’s (2014) and Adrian, Moench, and
Shin’s (2010) results are complementary, pointing to the importance of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation in explaining asset prices. By focusing on the volume of securitization, we
highlight the potential mechanism through which this link occurs. Consequently, in order
to increase our understanding of the potential channels through which securitization and
ﬁnancial intermediation activity aﬀects asset prices we build a model of ﬁnancial interme-
diation where securitization is used as a form of funding by a ﬁnancial entity (bank) who
holds a diverse portfolio of assets that include credit, government bonds and equity. We
turn to that next.
3. Model
In order to provide a rationale for the empirical results presented above, we build a
partial equilibrium model that focuses particularly on the portfolio choice of banks when
securitization of credit assets held on the balance sheet is feasible. As such, banks make two
key decisions: the securitization decision, which entails the creation of the securitization
market by designing and selling synthetic securities, and the portfolio decision of which
assets to hold on their balance sheet.
Initially, there are three assets available for the bank to invest in, credit assets (loans),
denoted Yi for i ∈ [1, n], government bonds (B), and equity (E). Banks will select a
portfolio of assets to maximize expected returns (proﬁt) facing two constraints: (i) a cash
constraint, as asset purchases must be funded by internal funds (capital) and external
funds, which comprise of direct bank borrowing and potential resources prevenient from
the securitization market and (ii) a risk constraint, such that banks care about risk.
We assume bank capital is constant and is not aﬀected by the securitization activity, as
suggested by our empirical evidence.
A fourth asset, denoted F , will be created by the bank. We assume the bank creates
a Special Purpose Vehicle (henceforth, SPV) which will serve as the agent commerciali-
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zing this asset to ﬁnal investors. Banks are willing to securitize assets since they have a
preference for liquidity16 (denoted by δ), which is passed on to the SPV. This assumption
ensures securitization is a cheaper form of funding relative to direct borrowing. The payoﬀ
of F will be a function of the performance of the basket of credit assets [Yi]
n
i=1, depending
on the security design. We assume banks receive information about the payoﬀ structure of
credit assets [Yi]
n
i=1 that is not available to the market at large, hence, the key component
inﬂuencing the securitization market will be the existence of this information asymmetry.
In order to simplify the exposition and its solution, we divide the model into four
stages. In the ﬁrst stage the bank sets up the SPV, selecting the design of security F .
During stage 2 the bank receives private information not available to the market at large
and selects its portfolio composition. At stage 3 all assets are transacted and in the ﬁnal
stage uncertainty is revealed and assets pay-out. Figure 5 shows the timeline of the model.
Figure 5: Model Timeline
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3.1. Securitization Decision
The securitization decision involves the design of the synthetic security and the setting
up of the SPV. Based on that the equilibrium in the securitization market is obtained,
allowing the quantity of asset F that is transacted and the price to be determined. These
variables will then be used in the portfolio decision to be explained next. Hence, the key
assumption is that the securitization and portfolio decisions can be solved independently.
This is accomplished by assuming that the SPV only cares about the liquidity generated
from the securitization market and that the equilibrium in this market is independent from
the portfolio allocation (we relax the second assumption in section 3.4). The securitization
part of the model follows DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) closely. In order
to determine the security design and the market equilibrium we introduce a number of
assumptions regarding the credit assets.
16Liquidity generation is not the only reason for securitizing assets. This may occur due to the desire
to transfers risk. The risk eﬀect will also be explored in our model. For a model where securitization does
not transfer risk but is used to reduce capital requirements see Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013).
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Each asset i has a ﬁnal payoﬀ of Yi = Xi + Zi. The component Xi represents the
bank’s private information about the payoﬀ of the credit asset that is not available to
other investors. Zi represents the remaining risk the bank faces. We assume Zi can
be divided into two components, an idiosyncratic part and an aggregate credit market
component, thus Zi = i + η. Let Y
n ≡ ∑ni=1 Yi denote the cumulative payoﬀ of credit
assets and Y ≡ (Y1, . . . , Yn) the vector of assets. Same deﬁnitions hold for X, Xn, Z, and
Zn. Finally, let X−i ≡ (X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn).
We then make the following assumptions
• A1. E[Zi | X] = 0 or E[Yi | X] = Xi.
• A2. Given any X−i, the conditional support of Xi is a closed interval and has
greatest lower bound Xi0 > 0.
• A3. i and η are independent of X and have log-concave density functions.
Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that X comprises all information available on Y , that
given the information on all other assets, there is still a range of possible information
states for asset i, and that the lower bound of that range is independent of X−i. Finally,
Assumption 3 ensures enough regularity on the distribution of shocks to allow for the
determination of the security design.
The securitization market and the creation of SPV
We assume the bank issues synthetic securities F and place them on the balance sheet
of an SPV. The key characteristic of the SPV is its preference for transforming these
securities in cash, or a liquidity preference. We denote this preference by parameter δ.17
Based on that, the SPV selects the amount q of synthetic securities to sell. Let PF (q)
denote the price of the synthetic security F when q units are sold, or the demand schedule
for security F . Then the SPV selects q equals to
arg max
q∈[0,1]
qPF (q) + δ(1− q)E[F | X] = arg max
q∈[0,1]
q(PF (q)− δE[F | X]) (2)
Thus, the preference for liquidity implies that assets not sold are discounted relative
to the cash gains from transacted synthetic securities. Therefore, the key characteristic
of the SPV is its desire to sell as much securities F as possible, since it prefers holding
cash (and transferring it back to the bank) than holding F on its balance sheet (although
its price might be equal to its expected value). The main obstacle for the SPV or for
the functioning of the securitization market is the existence of information asymmetries
between the ﬁnal investor and the SPV. Given its preference for liquidity, if the security
17We later link that to the implicit value of the cash constraint of the bank portfolio problem.
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F is priced according to its value based on all information available, let that price be
f = E[F | X], then the SPV would want to publicly oﬀer all stock of synthetic securities
or set q = 1. Would ﬁnal investors be willing to buy all the stock of synthetic securities?
Final investors do not have the same information set as the bank and will be trying to
determine the appropriate price. Assume he/she bids the lowest possible price (linked to
the lower bound of X, denoted f0 = E[F | X = X0]). On the on hand, if the SPV/bank
receives a signal X > X0, the value of the security is higher than the price bid by the
ﬁnal investor and thus the SPV may not be willing to sell all the stock of securities F ,
oﬀering only a lower proportion to the market (q < 1), thus indicating to investors that
the security is better than expected and its price should be greater than f0. On the other
hand, if the SPV received the worst possible signal (X = X0), it will sell all securities
conﬁrming the ﬁnal investor’s initial expectation. Hence, given a bid price of PF , the
public oﬀer of the SPV (q) will convey information about the bank’s private information
on the conditional payoﬀ of the security. In summary, the SPV security retention (oﬀering
q < 1) is a credible signal (of higher X) since retention is costly due to its preference
for liquidity. The market equilibrium (PF , q) is thus the equilibrium of a signalling game
in which uninformed investors compete for purchases of the security being oﬀered by the
SPV in a Walrasian market setting.
DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) provide the following characterization of this equilibrium.
Under assumptions A1 - A2,
q = (f/f0)
−1/(1−δ) and PF = f0(q)δ−1 = f (3)
is a unique separating equilibrium. The SPV payoﬀ function will be ΠSPV (f, f0) =
q(PF (q)−δE[F | X]) = f0(1−δ)(f/f0)−δ/(1−δ), where f = E[F | X], and f0 = E[F | X =
X0]. The equilibrium is obtained by solving (2), conditional on PF = f , and imposing the
boundary condition that PF (1) = f0.
Optimal Design of F
Having obtained the characterization of the equilibrium in the securitization market we
can now solve backwards to determine the security design (stage 1 in the model18). Given
the timeline of the model the synthetic security design is done before X is revealed to the
bank. Hence, the optimal design problem is given by maxF (.)E[Π
SPV (f, f0)]. DeMarzo
and Duﬃe (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) show that under assumptions A1 - A3 the optimal
monotone security design is a standard debt contract.19 That is F ∗(Y ) = min(d, Y n)
18Note that we do not need to determine the decision in stage 2 since the optimal design and the portfolio
decision are independent.
19We are assuming the bank will ﬁnd it optimal to pool all credit assets together and set a debt contract
dependent on Y n, instead of issuing a security F for each asset Yi. As DeMarzo (2005) shows, for a
large number of securities in the pool, when the variance of the idiosyncratic risk i is big enough, the
risk diversiﬁcation eﬀect is stronger than the information destruction eﬀect. In this scenario, pooling and
tranching delivers higher payoﬀ than tranching alone.
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for a constant d. The intuition is simple. The bank/SPV would like to maximize the
volume of securitized assets, but due to the information asymmetry, is forced to retain
some synthetic assets in the portfolio when the signal is good and information asymmetry
is high. Hence, it is optimal for the SPV to select a security that is as payoﬀ insensitive
as possible for the range of signals where asymmetry is at its highest. Standard debt has
this property since f does not change signiﬁcantly as X increases in the range X  d.
That way, the bank problem is
max
d
E[ΠSPV (fd, fd0 )], where f
d = E[min(d, Y n) | X].
In order to provide further characterization on the debt contract, PF and q, we assume
that η ∼ N(0, σ2) (recall that η is the aggregate credit shock aﬀecting all credit assets)
and Xn is uniformly distributed between X0 =
∑
i xi0 and X1 =
∑
i xi1. As we increase
the number of securities n, the value of f becomes
fdn = E[min(d,X
n + (1/n)
∑
i + η) | X] → E[min(d,Xn + η) | X] = fd
fd =
∫ (d−Xn)
−∞
(Xn + η)f(η)dη +
∫ ∞
(d−Xn)
df(η)dη
where f(η) is the density function of η
fd = XnΦ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
+ d
(
1− Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
))
− σφ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
where Φ(·) and φ(·) are the standard normal cumulative and density functions
Also note that fd0 = X0Φ
(
d−X0
σ
)
+ d
(
1− Φ
(
d−X0
σ
))
− σφ
(
d−X0
σ
)
. The aggregate
shock η, which is not diversiﬁed away as the basket of credit is constructed can also be
understood as the correlation risk amongst assets Yi, for i ∈ [1, n], within the basket.
Based on the solution for fd and fd0 , d
∗ is given by
d∗ = argmax
∫ X1
X0
(1− δ)(fd0 )1/(1−δ)(fd)−δ/(1−δ)
1
(X1 −X0)dX (4)
We are not able to obtain an analytical solution to this integral and thus oﬀer a
description of the main trade-oﬀ involved in the selection of d∗. Due to the presence of
information asymmetry the SPV is forced to retain a fraction (1−q) of synthetic securities.
That is costly since it prevents the SPV from maximizing liquidity creation. Hence, one
of the drivers behind the selection of d∗ is to minimize the information sensitivity of F .
Figure 6 shows the pay-oﬀ of the synthetic security to the ﬁnal investor for a low value
of d = d˜ (left-hand side) and for a high value of d = dˆ < X0, also depicting the range of
possible information Xn ∈ [X0, X1]. On the one hand, when d is small, the probability
that Y n (payoﬀ of credit) is such that the payoﬀ of ﬁnal investors is negative (region A) is
quite small (far away from range [X0, X1]) and the actual loss is also small. On the other
hand, when d is high the probability that Y n is such that the payoﬀ is negative (region
B) is greater (not far from range [X0, X1]) and the potential loss more sizeable. Hence,
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for d = dˆ it is relevant from the point of view of the ﬁnal investor to know if Xn = X0 or
Xn = X1, while when d = d˜ it is not as much. That is, the bank wants to select d
∗ as
small as possible to minimize the information sensitivity F , maximizing q. However, as the
bank decreases d∗, it also decreases PF (d∗) since d∗ > PF (d∗). As a result, total cash for
each unit of synthetic security sold is smaller. Thus, the desire to maximize cash receipts
from securitization through the price of security pushes d∗ up. Optimal d∗ balances the
trade-oﬀ between these two eﬀects, maximizing PF (d
∗)q(d∗).
Figure 6: Synthetic Security Payoﬀ and Optimal d
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3.2. Portfolio decision
Banks select a portfolio of equity, government bonds and credit to maximize expected
returns. Banks invest in three main assets: credit assets (loans), denoted Yi for i ∈ [1, n],
government bonds (B), and equity (E). Given the assumptions made on the returns of
credit assets [Yi]
n
i=1, and the fact that banks pool all these assets to design the synthetic
security, instead of looking at each asset i, we can concentrate directly on the credit basket
whose payoﬀ is equal to Y n. Let Qy be the quantity of pooled credit assets the banks
buy. Recall that due to the diversiﬁcation of idiosyncratic risks (i), the only source of
risk of the basket of credit comes from the aggregate uncertainty (η). We assume the
price of the basket is given by its expected payoﬀ conditional on the banks information set
Py = E[Y
n | Xn], but assume the bank can extract a credit mark-up (denoted μ(Xn, Qy))
while acting as a ﬁnancial intermediary. Although we do not model that explicitly this
could be due to the its informational advantage as in DeMarzo (2005), or because it has
some bargaining power over ﬁrms/agents that make loans. We assume μ(Xn, Qy) is a
function of (i) the signal Xn; the greater Xn relative to the lower bound X0 the greater
the bank’s information advantage and thus higher the mark-up; and (ii) the quantity
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transacted Qy; the greater the bank’s demand for credit assets (supply of loans), the lower
its mark-up. Thus, for μ1, μ2 > 0, we assume
μ(Xn, Qy) = μ¯+ μ1(X
n −X0)/X0 − μ2Qy. (5)
Government bonds payoﬀ is given by VB. We assume VB ∼ N(B, σ2B). Banks buy QB
units of bonds and pay price PB for each unit. Equity payoﬀ is given by VE . We assume
VE ∼ N(E , σ2E). Banks buy QE units of equity and pay price PE for each unit. Banks
take prices PE and PB as given while selecting their portfolio composition. Prices are then
determined in equilibrium based on market demand schedules PB(QB) and PE(QE) given
by
PB = αB + βBQB (6)
PE = αE + βEQE . (7)
In order to fund these assets, banks utilize internal funds (capital), denoted by Γ0, and
external funds, which comprise of direct bank borrowing (Υ) and resources prevenient
from the securitization market, which, from the results in the previous section, comprise
qPF for each unit of pooled credit asset (Qy). As a result of the separation between the
securitization and portfolio decisions, the bank, at this stage, takes (q, PF , f, f0,) as given.
The cost of bank borrowing is given by RF = R¯ + κ(Υ/Γ0). Thus, we assume the cost
of external funding increases from a base rate R¯ as borrowing increases relative to the
amount of bank capital. Bank proﬁts/returns (ΠB) are then given by
ΠB | Xn = Qy(Y n − Py) + μ(Xn, Qy)Qy
+QB(VB − PB) +QE(VE − PE)− qQy(F − PF )−RFΥ. (8)
We assume banks select the portfolio composition (Qy, QB, QE ,Υ) to maximize the
expected proﬁts E[ΠB | Xn] subject to two constraints. The ﬁrst asserts that the cost of
purchase of assets is equal to the amount of funds, or a cash constraint. That is given by
QyPy +QBPB +QEPE  Γ0 + qQyPF +Υ (9)
The second ensures the bank abides by a limit on risk taking or a risk constraint.20
It is common to assume that this constraint takes the form of the ﬁrst percentile of the
distribution of expected returns, or a Value-at-risk constraint. Although widely used in
20Adrian and Shin (2008) provide a contracting model motivating the use of such constraints.
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practice this type of constraint introduces complexity to the portfolio problem. Instead,
we assume that the bank faces a limit to the standard deviation of the portfolio returns.
If the assets in the portfolio were only credit, bonds and equity, given the assumption on
normally distributed payoﬀ, the two constraints (limit on standard deviation and on the
percentile of the distribution) are equivalent. When synthetic products are assumed then
the two may diverge since asset F ’s payoﬀ distribution is not symmetric.
The standard deviation of the portfolio returns is given by
σΠB | Xn =
(
Q2yσ
2 +Q2Bσ
2
B +Q
2
Eσ
2
E + 2QyQBσyB + 2QyQEσyE +
2QBQEσEB − 2qQ2yσFY − 2qQyQBσFB − 2qQyQEσFE + q2Q2yσ2F
)1/2
.
Where σab is the covariance between the payoﬀ of securities a and b, and σ
2
F is the
variance of the synthetic security. The risk constraint limits the standard deviation of the
bank proﬁts to be smaller or equal to a fraction of the total capital of the bank. This
fraction (χ), denotes the degree of risk aversion of the bank. Thus, the portfolio choice
must be such that
σΠB  χΓ0. (10)
Given the security design and the solution for fd we can now determine the variance
and covariances that involve the synthetic security F . They are (details can be found in
the Appendix)
σ2F |Xn = (Xn)2Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
−2Xnσφ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
−σ2
[
d−Xn
σ
φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
−Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)]
+d2
[
1−Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)]
−(fd)2
σFy |Xn = (Xn)2Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
−2Xnσφ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
−σ2
[
d−Xn
σ
φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
−Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)]
+d
[
Xn
(
1−Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
))
+σφ
(
d−Xn
σ
)]
−fdXn
σFB |Xn ≈ Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
σyB
σFE |Xn ≈ Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
σyE
The portfolio problem is given by
max
{Qy ,QB ,QE ,Υ}
E[ΠB | Xn] s.t. (9) and (10) (11)
Note that as a solution to this problem is obtained, one can ﬁnd the shadow value
(in term of proﬁts) of an extra unit of cash holding to the bank (lagrange multiplier of
the cash constraint, denoted λc). We can use this multiplier to pin down the value of
δ, the bank’s liquidity preference, or the discount factor of the SPV. Essentially, we will
set δ = 1 − λc, where λc is obtained when the portfolio decision is solved while setting
q = 0, or without securitization. This way we assess the bank’s desire to obtain cash from
securitization.
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3.3. Model Results
The equilibrium of the model is deﬁned as the vector of asset allocation {Qy, QB, QE ,
Υ, q} and the vector of prices {μ, PB, PE , PF , d} such that (i) given prices {Qy, QB, QE ,Υ}
solves problem (11); (ii) {q, PF } is a separating equilibrium of the signalling game; (iii)
the face value of debt d is given by (4); and (iv) given {Qy, QB, QE}, prices {μ, PB, PE}
are consistent with the credit spread (mark-up), (5), and the market demand schedules
(6) and (7).
Our main interest is to verify the eﬀect of securitization on the portfolio allocation
of banks, and through that, its eﬀect on asset risk premia. The bond risk premia in our
model can be deﬁned as BP (QB) ≡ E[VB] − PB, while the equity risk premia is given
by EP (QE) ≡ E[VE ]− PE . Given that the portfolio decisions and the equilibrium in the
securitization market are a function of the information set Xn ∈ [X0, X1], the equilibrium
is obtained for Xn within that interval. Note that when Xn = X0, banks do not have an
information advantage over the market, since the existence of the lower boundX0 is known.
However, as Xn increases from X0, banks have an advantage in determining the true value
of the credit basket, hence, the degree of information asymmetry between ﬁnal investors
and the bank increases. We solve the model for two cases, one where we constrain q = 0,
hence the market of securitization is disregarded (denoted Model No Sec) and one where
q, the securitization volume, is obtained based on the separating equilibrium described
above (denoted Model with Sec).
Due to the non-linearity of the risk constraint and the integral needed to the solved
to obtain the face value of debt (see (4)) we can only obtain numerical solutions. The
parameters used in the benchmark speciﬁcation are shown in table 1.21 Starting from the
return parameters, we set the mean payoﬀ on bonds to be around 5% and the mean payoﬀ
on equity to be that plus 3%. The parameters {αB, αE} are set such that if banks do not
buy any bonds or equity the risk premia on each asset are slightly above their mean average
in the data used in the empirical section. Parameters {βB, βE} control the sensitivity of
the risk premia to increases in bank asset demand. This is set such that if the bank uses
all its capital to buy one asset it oﬀsets most of the premia, ensuring bank portfolios are
not concentrated in one asset. We set the credit basket to pay a mark-up slightly greater
than the equity premium since credit is the riskier asset. The variance and covariance
structure is based on the data for government bond returns, the return on the S&P500
and the credit spread index (GZ) proposed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). Using this
21Although no calibration exercise is done we attempt to select parameters based on the relevant ﬁnancial
market data.
data we ﬁnd that the standard deviation of equity returns is 60% the standard deviation of
credit spreads, while that ratio is 20% for the case of government bonds. All asset payoﬀs
are found to be negatively correlated as reported in the table. We set X0 to be equal to
1.02 and the degree of information asymmetry m, given by the diﬀerent between X0 and
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X1, is set to 0.2 (two times the standard deviation of the aggregate shock). Finally, we set
δ to be equal to 1 minus the lagrange multiplier obtained from the solution of the bank
portfolio when securitization is not performed and limit the standard deviation of the
portfolio to be 7% of the banking capital (under normally distributed returns that would
imply limiting the loss under the ﬁrst percentile (Value-at-risk) to roughly 25% of bank
capital). We perform diﬀerent sensitivity analysis to most of the parameters described
in table 1 to verify the robustness of our predictions, but also as a tool to increase the
understanding of the key mechanism behind the impact of securitization on risk premia.
Table 1: Parameter Values - Benchmark Model
Return Variance Bank
E 0.03+1/0.95 σY 0.1 δ 0.983
B 1/0.95 σB 0.02 Γ0 5
αB B - 0.02 σE 0.06 χ 0.07
αE B +0.01 ρEY -0.49
βB
1
Γ0
0.025 ρEB -0.57
βE
1
Γ0
0.025 ρBY -0.4
R¯ 0.01
κ 1Γ0 0.05 Information
μ1 0.01 X0 1.02
μ2
1
Γ0
0.005 m 0.2
μ¯ 0.04 X1 X0 +m
3.3.1. Benchmark model
We start by presenting the results of the benchmark model. Figure 7 shows the diﬀe-
rence between the equilibrium of the full model (Model with Sec) and the one obtained
by setting q = 0, or restricting the bank to do no securitization. We report the bond and
equity premia, the ﬁnal credit market spread or mark-up (μ(Xn, Qy)), the bank’s asset
holdings/balance sheet (Qy +QB +QE), the amount of securitization (q) and ﬁnally the
percentage point change in the ratio of external borrowing and bank capital, measuring
the degree of leverage based on direct borrowing. The results are shown for the entire
range Xn ∈ [X0, X1].22 Note that the the degree of information asymmetry in the market
is directly related to the diﬀerence between Xn and the lower bound X0, which is known.
Hence, we deﬁne information asymmetry as the ratio (Xn −X0)/X0.
22We smooth the ﬁnal solution to correct for potential inaccuracies in the numerical optimization solu-
tion, see the Appendix for more details.
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Figure 7: Benchmark Model
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Firstly, allowing for securitization to be conducted implies the bank is able to increase
its asset holdings (balance sheet) across all the range of information asymmetries ([0, (X1−
X0)/X0]). This increase pushes bond premium, equity premium and credit mark-up down.
Second, securitization is at its highest when information asymmetry is at its lowest. The
SPV does not need to retain any synthetic security when it does not have an informational
advantage relative to ﬁnal investors. As information asymmetry increases it must retain
a greater portion of synthetic assets, not being able to exploit the securitization market
as much. As a result, balance sheet expansion generally decreases with more information
asymmetry,23 and consequently, the equilibrium bond and equity premium respond less.
The balance sheet expansion aﬀects all three assets for two main reasons: (i) due to
market demand sensitivity concentrating all expansion in one asset reduces the return
on that asset relative to the others, and (ii) due to diversiﬁcation gains banks are able
to manage risk exposures more eﬀectively by increasing allocation of all assets. Another
interesting feature is the eﬀect of securitization on the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
We observe that securitization replaces external borowing as a source of funding, in fact
23The increase observed as Xn → X1 occurs since securitization shares become constant but credit assets
are becoming relatively better assets and PF increases with X
n and thus the liquidity created for each
unit of securitized asset increases.
securitization becomes the main source of funding. Leverage based on external borrowing
(Υ) decreases signiﬁcantly relative to the case when securitization is not allowed.
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Hence, the key conclusion of the theoretical model is that although the intrinsic cha-
racteristics of the assets (payoﬀ and risk) in the banks portfolio has not changed and the
bank’s degree of risk aversion (represented by parameter χ) has remained the same, we ob-
serve that the risk premia required to maintain those assets on the balance sheet decrease
substantially as securitization is employed. This conﬁrms the empirical results presented
in section 2. We ﬁnd that an increase in securitization implies a drop in risk premia after
controlling for a set of variables that are related to the future payoﬀ of the assets (e.g.
dividend/price ratios, earnings-per-share, consumer expectations) or the degree of risk
aversion in the market (e. g. vix). The main driver of the volume of securitization is the
degree of information asymmetry. Thus, through the portfolio selection of the bank, the
degree of information asymmetry in credit markets leads to variation in risk premia.
This portfolio channel is present due to the eﬀect of securitization on the two main
constraints the bank face. Firstly, while external funds are costly since direct borrowing
must carry an interest rate that is increasing as bank leverage increases, banks are able
to acquire funds by creating and selling the synthetic securities that are linked to their
balance sheet holdings at signiﬁcantly lower costs. Thus, securitization relaxes the bank’s
cash constraint. Secondly, by designing a debt contract as the format of the synthetic
security the bank is also decreasing the extent of risk taking in credit markets. To see this
compare the payoﬀ of a (naked) credit basket (left panel in Figure 8), the short position
on the synthetic security (middle panel in Figure 8) and a portfolio that combines a long
position on the basket and a short position on the synthetic security (or the ﬁnal portfolio
of the bank after securitization, depicted in the right panel of Figure 8). The short position
on the synthetic security essentially protects the bank against losses when the credit basket
payoﬀ (Y n) is lower than the face value of debt (d). Thus, securitization also relaxes the
bank’s risk constraint.24 As a result, banks ﬁnd it optimal to increase asset holdings.
Since, banks have a preference for diversiﬁcation both due to the risk constraint and the
negative expected gain from overbidding in one single market, banks increase holding of
all asset classes. Therefore, securitization of credit implies low risk premia across all asset
classes.
In the benchmark model we assume banks select d optimally to maximize the SPV
gains from securitization. Given that the key aim is to decrease the eﬀects of information
asymmetry and thus reduce SPV retention of synthetic securities, banks set d∗ quite low
(optimal d is 0.81, signiﬁcantly lower than X0 = 1.02).
25 As a result, the proportion of
24Note that securitization aﬀects the left tail of the distribution of returns and thus the fact we use a
constraint on the standard deviation instead of a constraint on the ﬁrst percentile of losses decreases the
risk protection provided by securitization. This would be stronger for a standard Value-at-Risk constraint,
increasing the eﬀects of securitization on risk premia.
25Setting d low is eﬀectively the same as attempting to create AAA (safe) tranches, whose price will
then be insensitive to asymmetric information. Increasing d, for the same underlying asset, generates lower
rated tranches or riskier synthetic securities.
26
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Figure 8: Risk Proﬁle
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securitized assets traded (q) is greater than 0.94 for all Xn. However d∗ also has implica-
tions for the degree of risk protection a short position on synthetic securities provide. This
protection increases with d. We thus solve the securitization equilibrium and the portfolio
decision when d = 1.15×d∗, or the face value is 15% greater than in the benchmark case.26
This change has two main eﬀects. Firstly, as information asymmetry increases, securitiza-
tion, or more precisely q, decreases much faster than before (the synthetic security is more
sensitive to information). Secondly, in the event information asymmetries are low (for Xn
close to X0), and securitization volumes are high (since q is still high and PF is higher
27
due to higher d), the bank is able to relax the cash constraint signiﬁcantly. Additionally,
as d is greater, the risk protection provided by F is greater and thus the securitization
eﬀect on the bank’s risk constraint is stronger. As a result, in this scenario securitization
leads to larger bank balance sheets and even lower risk premia. For the high information
asymmetry case (for Xn close to X1), the eﬀect of lower q is too strong, limiting liquidity
creation and thus curtailing balance sheet expansion. Figure 9 shows our results.
Finally, note that in our model all assets are transacted and matured in a single
period, hence securitization aﬀects only the portfolio allocation in that period. However,
as Adrian and Shin (2010) show, when assets held in the balance sheet (for longer periods)
increase in value, that implies a capital gain, which relaxes the risk constraint next period,
allowing banks to further increase asset holdings.28 Hence, an increase in securitization,
which leads to a price increase of all asset due to the higher demand, would lead to
asset gains in banks’ portfolios, giving further strength to balance sheet increases and
26That implies in this alternative equilibrium deﬁnition only (i), (ii) and (iv) are satisﬁed (see deﬁnition
of equilibrium at the beginning of section 3.3).
27Note that PF is higher but the expected return of a riskier security, given by E(d− PF ), increases as
d increases.
28A similar argument is also stressed by Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2012). They show that asset
revaluations and value-at-risk constraints eﬀectively lead to banks becoming implicitly less risk averse
during periods where assets gain in value, generating lower risk premia and lower volatility of asset prices.
The mechanism that generates lower risk premia in our model does not rely on the revaluation of bank
equity/capital.
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Figure 9: Higher Face Value of Synthetic Security
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further movements in risk premia in the following periods through the revaluation of
bank equity. This feedback mechanism might explain why we observed empirically that
the securitization shock continues to aﬀect risk premia for a few periods after the initial
shock.
Before we move on to the analysis of the key implications of altering the main pa-
rameters of the model we take stock of the main features of our theoretical framework
that drive the results. Securitization volume is driven primarily by information asym-
metry and thus is orthogonal to asset prices. Due to idiosyncratic credit risk, pooling is
optimal, motivating the ﬁnancial intermediary role in markets. Moreover, due to infor-
mation asymmetry, tranching is optimal and thus synthetic securities are standard debt
contracts. Securitization, due to its asset backing nature, is assumed to be a cheaper form
of funding relative to direct borrowing. Securitization, then, leads to a relaxation of cash
and risk constraint allowing banks to increase leverage (recall that we empirically verify
that securitization and asset holdings of ﬁnancial entities are positively linked). Banks
are marginal price setters facing upward asset supply curves (thus, we implicitly assume
some degree of market segmentations exists) and have gains from asset diversiﬁcation, and
thus higher leverage leads to higher demand of assets, generating higher prices and lower
premia across diﬀerent asset classes. Consequently, higher volume of securitization leads
to lower risk premia.
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3.3.2. Sensitivity Analysis
We perform a number of sensitivity analyses to the parameter values used in the
benchmark model. Firstly, we increase the standard deviation of all assets (σ, σB, σE).
Secondly, we decrease the price sensitivity of bank demand for credit, bonds, equity and
bank borrowing, altering respectively (μ2, βB, βE and κ). Thirdly, we alter the correla-
tion structure of asset payoﬀs. In the ﬁrst scenario we reverse the sign of all correlation,
so assets are all positively correlated, and in the second, we reverse only the credit and
equity correlation, leaving government bonds to be negatively correlated to equity and cre-
dit. And ﬁnally, we decrease the risk aversion of banks (higher χ). In all those cases the
portfolio channel obtained in the benchmark model remains, more securitization leads to
lower risk premia. We discuss each of these scenarios below. Figure 10 shows all the results.
High Variance of Assets
We start by presenting the results of the model with higher variance of assets. First
observe that as variances increase, the SPV is not able to create synthetic securities that
are as insensitive to information asymmetry as before, since, given that Y n is more volatile,
f is also more volatile for the range Xn > d. That implies q is lower for any level of infor-
mation asymmetry. Secondly, as the bank acquires cash and relaxes the cash constraint,
it increases asset holdings, which increases risk taking, pushing the allocation closer to a
binding risk constraint. Given the higher asset risk, each unit of cash from securitization
thus buys more risk than it did in the benchmark case, making the risk constraint more
likely to bind for smaller increases in asset holdings. Thus, the balance sheet multiplier of
securitization is lower, and consequently, risk premia do not fall as much as before. As we
mentioned the variance of a credit basket (σ) is related to the risk that is not diversiﬁed
away in a basket, or the correlation risk of credit assets. We thus conclude that this cor-
relation risk through its impact on securitization volumes, aﬀect the level of risk premia
in the economy.
Low Price Sensitivity of Demand for Assets
We now look at the price sensitivity of demand. By assuming market demand sche-
dules (6), (7) we essentially assume that banks portfolio allocations aﬀect the price of
assets or that banks (collectively) are the marginal pricer in the market for assets. We
decrease these sensitivities (for all assets, including for bank borrowing) by 30%. This
modiﬁcation has two main eﬀects. Firstly, when banks cannot use securitization, they
set a portfolio of assets that is funded by external borrowing in a way that the cost of
funding and the potential gain on assets is such that proﬁts are maximised. As funding
costs do not increase as fast as before, bank’s utilize more external borrowing and thus
hold more assets (bigger balance sheet). As a result, when securitization is allowed the
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bank is not as cash constrainted as before, diminishing the impact of securitization on the
size of the balance sheet. Thus, the balance sheet expansion as securitization is allowed is
three percentage points smaller under this case than in the benchmark model. Secondly,
for any given increase in the demand for equity and bonds, the resulting change in premia
is smaller. Hence, under this scenario bond and equity premia do not decrease as much
as in the benchmark case. Nonetheless, the introduction of securitization, due to its eﬀect
on cash and risk constraints, leads to lower risk premia.
Figure 10: Sensitivity Analysis
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(a) High Variance of Assets
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(b) Low Price Sensitivity of Demand
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(d) Lower Bank Risk Aversion
New Correlation Structure
We perform two sensitivity exercises as regards the correlation structure of returns. In
the ﬁrst scenario, we reverse the sign of all correlations such that all assets are positively
correlated. In the second scenario we switch the sign of the correlation between credit
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and equity only. When all correlations are positive, the ability of the bank to maximize
proﬁts and abide by the risk constraint decreases since assets oﬀer less potential for di-
versiﬁcation. As a result, without securitization the bank is very constrained, using little
external funding. That implies that when the risk constraint is relaxed due to the ability
to securitize credit, the balance sheet can be increased further than in the benchmark
case. However, due to the lower diversiﬁcation role performed by equity and bonds the
balance sheet expansion is concentrated on the safest asset, namely bonds. As a result
bond premium decreases more than in the benchmark case while equity premium decreases
less. When equity and credit are positively correlated, but bonds remain negatively cor-
related with the other assets, then initial risk constraint is not as strict and thus balance
sheet expansions after securitization are smaller than when all correlations were positive.
However, bonds are not only the safest asset but also the best provider of diversiﬁcation.
Hence, in scenario 2 bond premium decrease further while equity premium moves very
little when compared to scenario 1.
Lower Bank Risk Aversion
Lastly, we look at the eﬀect of decreasing bank risk aversion, or making the risk
constraint laxer by increasing χ by 30%. As expected we see that given a laxer risk
constraint, the introduction of securitization allows banks to increase their balance sheets
further than in the benchmark case. However, due to the additional risk capacity available
banks favour the riskier asset (but the one that pays higher return), namely equity, over
the safer asset, bonds. As a result, bond premium decreases only slightly more compare to
the benchmark case, while the equity premium decrease is more substantial under lower
risk aversion. Note that in the last three cases the securitization market is not aﬀected,
since changes in risk aversion, covariance of risk and price sensitivity of assets demand
only aﬀect the portfolio decision, hence q is the same as the one in the benchmark case.
3.4. Extension
In the preceding analysis we assumed that the securitization market was independent
from the portfolio allocation of banks. Hence, if banks were to increase Qy, that would
not impact the securitization market, whose equilibrium was obtained for each unit of F
or Qy. Implicitly, in the separating equilibrium of the market for synthetic securities the
ﬁnal investors would absorb all securities the SPV auctions as long as PF = E[f | Xn], or
that the security price is equal to its expected value. In this extension we modify the ﬁnal
investor market demand condition by assuming that ﬁnal investors require that
PF = E[F | Xn]− ξQy
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where ξ > 0. Thus, under this market assumption, ﬁnal investors would require an
increasing premium to hold a greater volume of synthetic security auctioned by the SPV.
We continue to solve the model by looking at the securitization decision ﬁrst and after
that we obtain the portfolio decision. We simplify the securitization decision by taking
the security design as given, thus, we assume F = min(d, Y n) for an exogenously ﬁxed d.
The securitization decision therefore only involves the determination of the new separating
equilibria
The Bayes-Nash separating equilibrium (q∗, P ∗F ) of the signalling game requires that
• The solution q∗ is such that q∗ ∈ argmaxq∈[0,1] q(PF (q)− δf) almost surely, and
• The price is P ∗F = f − ξQy almost surely
where f = E[f | X = Xn]
A separating equilibrium, assuming (1− δ)f > ξQy, is given by
q∗ =
(
f − ξQy/(1− δ)
f0 − ξQy/(1− δ)
)−1/(1−δ)
and P ∗F = f − ξQy (12)
with q∗ = 0 if (1− δ)f < ξQy. See the Appendix for the proof.
The key modiﬁcation is that now q∗ = q(f, f0, Qy) and P ∗F = PF (f, f0, Qy) are a
function of Qy. Thus, the bank must take that into account when solving the portfolio
allocation. The portfolio returns are given by
ΠB | Xn = Qy(Y n − Py) + μ(Xn, Qy)Qy
+QB(VB − PB) +QE(VE − PE)− q(Qy)Qy(F − PF (Qy))−RFΥ
The portfolio problem is then given by
max
{Qy ,QB ,QE ,Υ}
E[ΠB | Xn] s.t.
QyPy +QBPB +QEPE  Γ0 + q(Qy)QyPF (Qy) + Υ
σΠB  χΓ0.
where
σΠB | Xn =
(
Q2yσ
2 +Q2Bσ
2
B +Q
2
Eσ
2
E + 2QyQBσyB + 2QyQEσyE + 2QBQEσEB
−2q(Qy)Q2yσFY − 2q(Qy)QyQBσFB − 2q(Qy)QyQEσFE + (q(Qy))2Q2yσ2F
)1/2
.
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Finally, the equilibrium of the model is the deﬁned as the vector of asset allocation
{Qy, QB, QE , Υ, q} and the vector of prices {μ, PB, PE , PF } such that (i) given prices
and q(Qy), {Qy, QB, QE ,Υ} solves problem (11); (ii) given Qy, {q, PF } is a separating
equilibrium of the signalling game; and (iii) given {Qy, QB, QE}, prices {μ, PB, PE} are
consistent with the credit spread (mark-up), (5), and the market demand schedules (6)
and (7).
Figure 11: Risk Premia in Synthetic Security Market
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We select the same parameters as in the benchmark model but set F = min(d, Y n)
with d = 1.15 × d(benchmark), or the benchmark model with higher d. Furthermore,
we set ξ = 0.0015 ensuring the condition for the separating equilibrium with positive q∗
holds. Figure 11 shows the results. We ﬁnd that the share of securitization in equilibrium
is always smaller in the alternative model relative to the benchmark model. The intuition
for this result is as follows. In the benchmark model SPV has to retain some securities to
signal that their value (based on the private information) is above its lower bound. This
retention occurs as an optimal response in a Walrasian market where the ﬁnal investor
is trying to ascertain he/she has acquired all information related to the security payoﬀ.
Given that in the alternative model the ﬁnal investors require a premium to buy a security,
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implying a lower bid (for all information states) than in the benchmark case, the optimal
retention of the SPV to avoid a further drop in prices is higher (selling synthetic securities
became a worst business relative to before). As a result, in a state where signals are good
the SPV would hold a bigger share of securities in equilibrium than when the price were
equal to its expected value. Naturally, when there is no information asymmetry, given that
the preference for cash is higher than the size of the premium, the SPV is willing to sell
all securities thus q = 1 in both the benchmark and the alternative speciﬁcation. Smaller
securitization volumes, as before, imply lower balance sheet expansion and lower drops
in asset risk premia. Also note that as a result of the premia paid in the securitization
market, bank proﬁts are reduced in the extended model not only due to lower balance sheet
expansion but also due to the expected loss in the synthetic security (eﬀectively, the bank
is now paying for the risk protection oﬀered by the synthetic security; note that when this
price becomes too high the bank may end up doing no securitization). We thus conclude
that, if asymmetric information problems exist, the compensation ﬁnal investors require to
bear synthetic securities (tranch related) risk (ξ) inﬂuences the volume of securitization,
aﬀecting bond and equity premia.
4. Discussion
We have shown that the pooling and tranching of assets held on the balance sheet of
ﬁnancial companies not only creates liquidity, alleviating their cash constraint, but also
relaxes their risk constraint. Both of these eﬀects allow banks to expand asset holdings,
increasing the importance of the sector that is more actively participating in this market
relative to the others in the economy (particularly households and ﬁrms but also traditional
commercial banks), and pushing asset prices up and risk premia down. As a result,
although the payoﬀ outlook of assets has remained the same, as do their risk proﬁle, the
compensation to undertaking risk in the economy decreases. That way, one implication of
our model is that increasing volumes of securitization are associated with low risk premia.
In 2005, the Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan remarked that although the short-term in-
terest rate had been increased by 150 basis points, long-term bond yields had not followed
suit, leading to a ﬂat yield curve. This unanticipated behaviour of bond yields was cha-
racterized as a conundrum. Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu (2006) and Backus and Wright
(2007), amongst others, have looked at the main causes of (relatively) too low bond yields.
The general view is that this was due to a fall in the term premium, probably associa-
ted with some combination of diminished macroeconomic and ﬁnancial market volatility.
Our work provide a diﬀerent channel driving the observed low (and persistent) levels of
bond or term premium. The period of 2003 - 2006 experienced a sharp and consistent
increase in the volume of ABS transacted in the US. That would have allowed banks to
increase their asset allocations, leading to a downward pressure on risk premia. We plot
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the levels of securitization and the bond premium from yearly 2000 until October 2007.29
Bond premium and volume of securitization are clearly strongly negatively correlated.30
In Aksoy and Basso (2014), we build a macroeconomic model linking term premia with
bank liquidity risk, showing how movements in term spread are linked to bank portfolio
choice, conﬁrming the conclusion obtained here but employing a standard DSGE model.
Figure 12: ABS issuance versus Bond Premium
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During the same period, the ﬁrst half of the 2000’s, Rajan (2005) also pointed out
that current practices in ﬁnancial intermediation may be a source of shifting risks, but
stressed they remained in the system. He focuses particularly on the incentives of bank
managers as a driving force in this process. In our model, managers maximize returns
using synthetic instruments to increase liquidity creation and to shift some risks to ﬁnal
investors. That allows them to increase asset positions that depressed risk premia in the
economy. Nonetheless, the risk proﬁle of the assets remained the same, thus as our model
suggests, the compensation for risk is lower (perhaps decreasing the general perception of
risk) but the actual volatility of payoﬀs remained the same.
Another implication of our results is to highlight the importance of looking at ﬁnancial
intermediation, as well as ﬁnal investors, to increase our understanding of the dynamic
movements in asset prices. Many advances in asset pricing (particularly the ones linked
to the macroeconomic literature) have focused on diﬀerent forms of a consumption Euler
equation, linking volatility of asset prices with consumption or ﬁnal investors decision.
Recent studies, however, point to the importance of ﬁnancial intermediation. He and
29We smoothed the series (6 month cubic spline) to reﬂect the overall pattern. Note that we perform
a robustness test to exclude the period 2003-2006, eliminating the possibility that trends are driving our
empirical results. Moreover, our equity premium series does not display any trends.
30Note that our empirical results suggest this may not be due to decreased uncertainty or risk perception
given that the securitization eﬀect on risk premium remains after controlling for a measure of risk perception
(vix).
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Krishnamurthy (2013) look at the relevance of capital constraints, particularly during
ﬁnancial crises, in making ﬁnancial intermediaries be the marginal investors in the market,
and hence setting risk premia. Our results show that ﬁnancial intermediaries’ balance
sheets can be important in asset pricing even when banking capital is held constant and
are not a direct concern. Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014), like us, also look more generally
at the link between ﬁnancial intermediation and asset pricing. They show that single
factor models using shocks to the leverage of security and broker-dealers perform as well
as multifactor models in pricing equity and bond portfolios. Instead of looking directly at
the growth of assets, our work attempts to look closely at the portfolio choice of ﬁnancial
intermediaries to try to establish the main channels through which their activity inﬂuence
asset prices. We ﬁnd that the usage of pooling and tranching of credit assets to be a
crucial activity allowing banks to relax both their cash and risk constraints, making them
the marginal investor in pricing not only credit but also equity and bonds.
As a result, the link between intermediation and asset prices is directly related to the
drivers of the volume of securitization in the economy. The key driver of securitization
in the DeMarzo and Duﬃe’s (1999) framework, employed here, is the degree of asymme-
tric information.31 Focusing on informational issues also allow us to stress the optimality
of pooling and tranching, key components behind the portfolio mechanism we propose.
However, the benchmark model and the extension presented also identify other drivers of
the volume of securitization, while holding asymmetric information constant. Firstly, we
observe that as the remaining risk of credit baskets (the correlation amongst individual
credit instruments or the aggregate risk, denoted by η in our model) increases, synthetic
securities become more information sensitive and thus ﬁnal investors are less willing to
hold a greater fraction of the tranches created. Secondly, if synthetic securities, due to
its potential risks, must oﬀer a premium for its holders (extension in section 3.4), the
higher the premium, the lower the volume of securitization. Thus, if agents required lower
(higher) compensation to undertake the risk embedded into those tranches32, due to for
31In order to verify the link between the volume of securitization and degree of information asymmetry,
validating DeMarzo and Duﬃe’s (1999) framework, we would require data on the degree of asymmetric
information or the “forced” retention of synthetic assets on the balance sheet of ﬁnancial intermediaries
during the securitization process. Neither variable is available in our dataset. In a market outcome, if
retention is not done, PF , the price of the security at the auction day, must decrease. Deal prices are
available in our sample, and thus we construct a monthly price discount variable given by
∑
tranches(100−
PF )× (Face V alue of tranch)/V olume Securitization for each month. Another implication of the model
is that the lower d (the safer the tranches), the higher q will be, implying potentially higher volumes of
securitization. We thus calculate the ratio of AAA rated tranches to the total volume of securitization per
month. We then regress these two variables on the volume of securitization (we are only after correlation,
not being able to establish causality). We ﬁnd that both variables are signiﬁcant and as expected the
higher the price discount, the lower the total amount of securitization (measured as face value) and the
higher the ratio of triple AAA rated tranches, the higher the volume of securitization. Results are available
from the authors upon request.
32This movement in compensation must be orthogonal to the risk compensation require to hold equities
and bonds.
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instance, misunderstanding of the risks involved in triple AAA synthetic securities (Coval,
Jurek, and Staﬀord (2009)), due to institutional investors’ sentiment (Ivashina and Sun
(2011)) or due to miscalculation of the probability of rare events (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and
Vishny (2010)), then levels of securitization will be higher (lower).33 Therefore, securiti-
zation volumes may vary due to the ﬂuctuations in the degree of information asymmetry,
in the (mis) perceived credit basket riskiness or in the compensation to undertake tranche
related risk (which are unrelated to equity and bond markets). As long as pooling and
tranching is done, allowing banks to relax cash and risk constraints, the portfolio mecha-
nism highlighted here will link variations in securitization to bond and equity premia.34
Our model took the degree of information asymmetry as given and provided a so-
lution whereby in equilibrium all agents become aware of all information while pricing
the credit basket. However, we note that the incentives for bank managers is to increase
actual information asymmetry, since that way they obtain better conditions in the ori-
gination of credit assets (loans) but would like to decrease the “perceived” information
asymmetry when compared to ﬁnal investors in the distribution market. That way they
would maximize the liquidity creation of the securities on their balance sheet. This might
have generated strong conﬂict of interests between the diﬀerent divisions in large ﬁnancial
corporations. That would be particularly the case since these institutions not only parti-
cipate in the origination and distribution of assets, but also act as ﬁnal investors (through
diﬀerent funds) and investment advisors for ﬁnal investors.35 Thus, modelling the acqui-
sition of information and the agency problems involved are then crucial to understand the
risk implications of securitization and bank portfolio choices. Building on the framework
discussed here, one interesting (but potentially cumbersome) extension would be to relax
the assumption that X0 (the lower bound of the information set) is common knowledge,
incorporating a signal extraction mechanism that opens the possibility of misinformation.
For instance, Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2013) document that buyers received false infor-
mation about the true quality of assets in contractual disclosures by intermediaries during
the sale of mortgages.
Finally, our theoretical model, by looking at the portfolio choice of ﬁnancial entities,
provides a rationale for the empirically observed link between securitization and asset
prices. An alternative explanation is that deeper securitization markets, by introducing
new assets in the economy, provide additional insurance instruments previously unavai-
33There is evidence these factors played an important role in the surge of securitization during the 2003
- 2007 period (Chernenko, Hanson, and Sunderam (2013)).
34Note also that although our model is static, the main mechanism highlighted here can also carry
through in a dynamic model where the main drivers of securitization, namely, the degree of information
asymmetry, credit basket riskiness and compensation to undertake tranche related risk, vary through time.
35This conﬂict of interest might have been manifested in the last crisis. For instance, reports suggest that
“JPMorgan Chase & Co said it routinely overstated the quality of mortgages it was selling to investors,
and it agreed to pay 13 billion USD to settle related charges with the U.S. government, federal oﬃcials
said on Tuesday.” (Reuters (Nov. 19, 2013))
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lable, depressing risk premia. However, while volumes of securitization have trended posi-
tively from 1993 until the crisis, we do not observe such trends in bond and equity premia.
Moreover, Simsek (2013) shows that under heterogenous believes, ﬁnancial innovation or
the introduction of new assets, due to enhanced speculation motives, may push risk pre-
mium up, oﬀsetting the insurance eﬀect. Nonetheless, other mechanisms explaining the
link between securitization and asset prices might also be at play.
5. Final Remarks
The volume of transactions in the securitization market has increased substantially
since the beginning of the 90’s. Using a monthly dataset of asset-backed securities (ABS)
and mortgage backed securities (MBS) transactions in the US we ﬁnd that increases in
the volume of ABS transacted aﬀect both the bond and the equity premium. This eﬀect
is not related to aggregate risk nor the link between volume traded and economic or asset
payoﬀ outlook. Thus, the empirical results point to the relationship between ﬁnancial
intermediation and asset prices. Consequently, we build a model that focuses particularly
on the portfolio choice of banks when securitization of credit assets held on the balance
sheet is feasible. We show that an increase in securitization leads to lower equity and
bond premium since creating and selling synthetic securities relaxes both the cash and the
risk constraint of banks. Thus, the key variables to understand the link between ﬁnancial
intermediation and asset prices are the main drivers of securitization volumes, namely
degree of asymmetric information, the pricing of the correlation risk of credit baskets and
the assessment of the ﬁnal investors compensation for undertaking tranche related risk.
A number of diﬀerent extensions to our framework, both empirically and theoretically,
may prove to be fruitful research projects. First, looking at micro bank data, particularly
at portfolio compositions during periods of high volume of ABS and MBS issuance might
clarify the main channel, which was explored here only at the aggregate level. Second,
our model characterized a partial equilibrium of bank portfolio choice. Extending the
framework to a general equilibrium model, which also incorporates some form of market
segmentation, is important to understand the eﬀects of this process to other asset holders.
Our results point to importance of information asymmetry between intermediaries and
ﬁnal investors. Studying the information acquisition process of credit basket’s payoﬀ and
risk (correlation of individual credit assets) may improve our understanding of the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial intermediation on asset prices. Finally, Chabakauri (2014) provides an analy-
tical survey on the diﬀerential eﬀects of borrowing and short sale constraints and limited
participation on asset prices in an environment where ﬁnal investors have heterogenous
preferences and beliefs. Extending our framework to incorporate ﬁnal investor constraints
may be relevant to explore the impact of securitization on asset prices.
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Figure 13: Impulse Responses - Parsimonious Model - Sample Period 01/1993 until
12/2002
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premium and equity premium obtained are very similar to the benchmark case, however,
the contribution of a securitization shock in explaining FEV of bond and equity premia
decreases from around 6 - 7%, observed in the benchmark case, to around 3 - 4%.
Benchmark - Sample Period 01/2009 until 09/2013
This estimation allows us to analysis the link between securitization and asset prices
in the post-crisis period. The VAR speciﬁcation remains unchanged. Impulse responses
Figure 14: Impulse Responses - Parsimonious Model - Sample Period 01/2009 until
09/2013
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for bond premium and equity premium obtained are somewhat similar to the benchmark
case. We ﬁnd that a securitization shock contributes in explaining around 6% of FEV in
excess bond return and around 5% of FEV in excess market return, similar to what we
obtained in the benchmark case.
Appendix A. Robustness of Empirical Results
1.1. Benchmark
Benchmark - Sample Period 01/1993 until 12/2002
This sample excludes the boom period of securitization occurred from 2003 until the
ﬁnancial crisis. The VAR speciﬁcation remains unchanged. Impulse responses for bond
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Robustness Check on Identiﬁcation We perform two robustness check on our recursive
identiﬁcation assumption. Firstly we reverse the order of the securitization variable putting
it last in the vector of variables, thus all asset prices can only respond to securitization
with a lag. Secondly, we obtain the contemporaneous response of securitization to shocks
in spreads, excess bond and market returns, verifying whether reverse causality was a
possibility. Change the ordering only aﬀects the negative movement observed for spreads
in the benchmark estimation. Reverse causality does not seem to occur, or securitization
does not respond to shocks to risk premia or the only statistically signiﬁcant response is
positive.
Figure 15: Impulse Responses - Reverse Ordering
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Figure 16: Impulse Responses - ABS response to asset price shocks
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1.2. Additional Robustness
In ﬁgure 17 we show that controlling for foreign demand for U.S. assets does not impact
the mechanism by which securitization aﬀects asset prices.
1.3. Quarterly Data
We now turn to the results of the estimations using quarterly data. The main reason
to use this frequency is that we can then control for the asset holdings of securities and
brokers dealers, which other studies have shown to be important in explaining asset prices.
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Figure 17: Augmented Models - Foreign demand for U.S. assets
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(a) Impulse Response to Asset-backed Securities
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(b) Impulse Response to Mortgage-backed Securities
The ﬁrst ﬁgure below shows the estimations when either securitization or asset holdings
is included in the VAR. The second ﬁgure shows the impulse responses to a securitization
shock when both variables are included in the VAR. We observe that controlling for asset
growth of these ﬁnancial institutions does not altered the explanatory power of securi-
tization and that a shock to securitization leads to a sharp increase in asset holdings,
supporting the portfolio link explored in the theoretical model.
Figure 18: Impulse Responses - Quarterly Frequency - Benchmark
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1.4. Predictive Regressions
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Predictive Regressions- OLS Estimates
1993M1-2007M11
spread xbr xr
dABSt−1 −0.0115 −0.0015 −0.2247
dABSt−2 0.0627 −0.0024∗ −0.3718∗∗
dABSt−3 −0.0458 −0.0002 −0.2807
dABSt−4 −0.1776∗∗ −0.0018 0.1259
rpdt−1 −1.5549 0.0185 1.3005
rpdt−2 −1.2749 −0.0233 −3.2139
rpdt−3 1.8857 0.0011 1.6579
rpdt−4 0.9081 0.0036 0.2732
spreadt−1 0.9497∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.2499
spreadt−2 −0.2746∗∗ −0.0074∗∗∗ −0.2934
spreadt−3 0.3544∗∗∗ 0.0011 −0.114
spreadt−4 −0.0696 −0.0008 0.2041
xbrt−1 3.7802 0.9335∗∗∗ −23.1635∗∗
xbrt−2 −4.4753 0.1566 22.3724
xbrt−3 −1.3059 −0.0332 3.7552
xbrt−4 −1.938 −0.0926 −13.1742
xrt−1 −0.0582 0.0022∗∗ 0.0612
xrt−2 −0.1647∗ 0.0003 −0.0823
xrt−3 −0.1608∗ −0.0009 −0.1122
xrt−4 0.0702 0.0006 −0.0639
realr 3mt−1 0.01 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0388
realr 3mt−2 −0.3682∗∗ −0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0043
realr 3mt−3 0.1685 −0.001 −0.3308
realr 3mt−4 0.1744 0.0015 0.3195∗
R2 0.9161 0.9372 0.166
n.o.b. 175 175 175
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at 10,5,1 percent, respectively.
Appendix B. Risk Proﬁle of the Synthetic Asset F
In this appendix we show the details of the derivation of the variance of asset F and
its covariance with the other three assets, namely, the credit basket, government bonds
and equity.
The variance of F is given by
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Figure 19: Impulse Responses - Quarterly Frequency
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(a) Securitization and Asset Holdings of Sec. Brokers
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(b) Securitization and Bank Capital
σ2F =
∫ ∞
−∞
(F − E[F | Xn])2f(η)dη =
∫ ∞
−∞
(min(d,Xn + η)− E[F | Xn])2f(η)dη
σ2F =
∫ (d−Xn)
−∞
(Xn + η)2f(η)dη +
∫ ∞
(d−Xn)
d2f(η)dη − (fd)2
σ2F = (X
n)2Φ
(
d−Xn
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σ
)]
+d2
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1−Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)]
−(fd)2
The covariance between the synthetic asset F and the credit basket Y n is given by
σFy =
∫ ∞
−∞
(F − E[F | Xn])(Xn + η −Xn)f(η)dη =
∫ ∞
−∞
min(d,Xn + η)(Xn + η)f(η)dη
σFy =
∫ (d−Xn)
−∞
(Xn + η)2f(η)dη +
∫ ∞
(d−Xn)
d(Xn + η)f(η)dη − fdXn
σFy = (Xn)2Φ
(
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σ
)
−2Xnσφ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
−σ2
[
d−Xn
σ
φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
−Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)]
+d
[
Xn
(
1−Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
))
+σφ
(
d−Xn
σ
)]
−fdXn
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The covariance between the synthetic asset F and equity (where f(η, VE) is the joint
density function of the aggregate credit risk and the equity risk) is given by
σFE =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
min(d,Xn + η)VEf(η, VE)dηdVE
σFE =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ (d−Xn)
−∞
(Xn + η)VEf(η)dη +
∫ ∞
(d−Xn)
VE(X
n + η)f(η)dη − fdXn
Due to the multivariate density function we can not obtain analytical solutions.
However, note that F = Y n if η < d−Xn and is constant otherwise, thus we use
σFE ≈ Prob(η < d−Xn)σEy = Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
σEy
Using the same argument σFB ≈ Prob(η < d−Xn)σBy = Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
σBy.
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Appendix C. Accuracy of Optimization and Linear Inter-
polation
All results reported in the section 3 are smoothed due to potential accuracy problems
in the numerical solution of the portfolio optimization problem. We ﬁnd as we change Xn
from X0 to X1 the portfolio solution for the case when no securitization is allowed does not
change. However, in some cases a small change in Xn result in a more sizable movement
in the portfolio allocations. This may be due to the fact that the lagrangian of the
optimization problem is very insensitive to small changes to the portfolio holdings as Xn
changes. As a result, the optimization routine ﬁnds it optimal to maintain asset holdings
ﬁxed, increasing external funding (Υ) only to satisfy the cash constraint (recall that Py
increases as Xn increases) leaving the other constraint (risk) unaﬀected. As Xn continues
to increase, a re-balancing is ﬁnally optimal under the accuracy used by the optimization
routine and the portfolio allocations change. This produces a stepwise solution to portfolio
holdings for the model without securitization. This does not occur with the model with
securitization since Xn aﬀects q leading to changes in both constraints and the objective
function when Xn changes. In order to smooth the portfolio choice, possibly correcting
for accuracy problems, we interpolate linearly the solutions across Xn. Figure 13 displays
the raw solution and the linearly interpolated solutions for the Benchmark model. Note
that this does not aﬀect the main conclusions of our model.
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Figure 20: Accuracy and Linear Interpolation
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agent’s optimization problem (see DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) for details). The ﬁrst order
condition of the SPV (assuming interior solution) is
q
dP ∗F
dq
+ (P ∗F − δf) = 0
Substituting for the Bayes-Nash equilibrium condition (ii) gives
dP ∗F
dq
+
(1− δ)
q
P ∗F =
δfξQy
q
The separating equilibrium is given by a the solution to this diﬀerential equation with
the boundary condition that P ∗F (1) = f0 − ξQy. Note that if (1 − δ)f < ξQy then it is
optimal to SPV to set q∗ = 0 for all Xn (in this case the solution to SPV problem is not
interior).
Appendix D. Separating Equilibrium - Extension
Under the alternative speciﬁcation for the market demand the monotonicity of q∗, as
well as the single crossing property, shown in DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999), continue to hold.
Thus, to ensure q∗ is optimal we need only check the ﬁrst-order condition of the informed
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